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Abstract 
Consumer return is considered in a coordination of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer.  A 
distribution free approach is employed to deal with a centralized decision model and a decentralized model which are 
constructed under the situation with only knowing the demand function's mean and variance, respectively. A 
markdown money contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain, and it is also proved that the contract can make 
the supply chain perfectly coordinated. Several numerical examples are given at the end of this paper.  
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1.  Introduction  
With the intensification of market competition, retailers provide more after sale services to attract 
consumers. A returns policy is prevalent in the retail industries, as reported that the value of returned 
items exceeds $100 billion per year in the United States [1].  But only 5% of the items are returned just 
because of the imperfect quality [2], the reason for the rest returned items lies in the uncertain evaluation 
when consumers buy the specific items. Different types of consumer returns policy have been studied in 
recent years. Moorthy and Srinivasan (1995) [3] pointed out that generous returns policy helps to signal 
high quality. Hess et al. (1996) [4] showed that inappropriate returns could be controlled in a profitable 
way by imposing nonrefundable charges and that these charges increased with the value of the 
merchandise ordered. Heiman et al. (2002) [5] modelled money-back guarantees as an option. Yabalik et 
al. (2005) [6] developed an integrated approach for analyzing logistics and marketing decisions within the 
context of designing an optimal returns system for a retailer servicing two distinct market segments. Su 
(2007) [7] and Aviv and Pazgal (2008) [8] studied dynamic pricing problems where consumers made 
purchase decisions based on expected future price.  
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Our work is closely related to the literature on markdown money contract with supply chain. As 
pointed out by Cachon (2003) [9] , the name of returns policy or buyback contract is somewhat 
misleading since it implies physical returns of overstock at the end of the selling season, which only 
happens when the manufacturer's salvage value is higher than the retailer's. If the retailer has the 
liquidation advantage, the markdown money contract rather than the buyback policy can coordinate the 
channel [10]. Xiao et al. (2010) [11] integrated consumer returns policy and manufacturer 
buyback/markdown money policy.      
Foregoing literatures always assume that the market demand is a stochastic with a known 
distribution. However, in most cases, the distributional information of the demand is very limited. 
Sometimes, all that is available is an educated guess of the mean and of the variances. There is a tendency 
to use normal distribution under these conditions. Nevertheless, the normal distribution does not provide 
the best protection against the occurrence of other distributions with the same mean and the same 
variance. Scarf (1958) [12] took a conservative approach to model a newsboy problem where only the 
mean and the variance of the demand are know without any further assumptions about the form of the 
distribution of the demand. Through a lengthy mathematical argument, he obtained a closed form 
expression for the optimal order quantity. Gallego and Moon (1993) [13] considerably simplified the 
proof of Scart's ordering rule and made it easier to understand and easier to remember. In this paper, we 
use the conservative approach to deal with the outlined above when the distributional information is 
limited to the mean and the variance.  
In this paper, we develop our model on the base of Xiao's one (Xiao et al., 2010) by limiting the 
demand distribution to the mean and the variance and differing the aptitude for the recovering value from 
the surplus product between the manufacture and the retailer. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
In the next section, we give relative notation and assumptions. Section 3 introduces the basic model under 
the markdown money contract. Section 4 studies the coordination mechanism via markdown money. In 
Section 5 numerical examples are given to illustrate explicitly the effects of the consumer return behavior 
on the supply chain performance. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 8 with some suggestions for 
future work in this area. 
2. Notation and Assumptions 
The following notation is used: 
c           the unit production cost; 
( )>w c   the unit wholesale price; 
( )>p w  the unit retail price; 
v     the random valuation for the consumer’s preference, which has an increasing cumulative distribution 
( )⋅G  over the interval [ , ]v v ;
r     the refund amount paid to the consumers when there are products returned, and [0, ]r p∈ ;
X    a random demand consisting of a stochastic, ξ , and      non-stochastic, ( )D r , i.e., ( ) ξ= +x D r ,
where ( )D r  is an increasing function of the refund amount r , and ξ  is a random variable with 
only the mean μ  and the deviation σ  known. Therefore, the mean and the standard deviation of 
X denotes ( ) μ+D r  and σ , respectively; 
is    the salvage value per unit when liquidated by party i where i M= refers to the manufacturer and 
i R= refersto the retailer; 
'
is     the salvage value per unit sold but returned of party i , { },i M R∈ ;
il       the party 'i s inspection and disposition cost per unit of the returned products , { },i M R∈ ;
l     the total inspection and disposition cost per returned products; 
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m      the manufacturer’s markdown money per unit leftover of the retailer; 
0c       the consumer’s returns cost per unit return of consumers; 
1G      the probability of returning the product for consumers, and 1 0( )G G r c= − .
     The mathematical models presented in this study have the following assumptions: 
1. The supply chain which we considered is composed of one manufacturer, one retailer and the end 
consumers. 
2. The consumers did not fully know their valuation for the products until they have some relevant 
experiences. 
3. The end consumers could return products if they want. 
4. The error ε  is independent of the consumer’s valuation v .
5. The leftovers include the products that were unsold as well as that were sold but returned. 
6. The manufacture and the retailer incur the inspection and disposition of the returned products by 
consumers. 
7. The salvage for the unsold products is  are greater than 'is , the residual for the sold but returned ones. 
8. There is a relationship used to constrain the parameters: is c w< < . The first inequality is to prevent 
infinite order by retailer, and the second one is necessary for the manufacturer's participation. 
3. The Basic Model 
3.1 The retailer's profit model 
According to the external demand, the retailer decides a proper order quantity Q to maximize his 
own profit. Note that min{ , }X Q  units are sold, where 1 min{ , }G X Q  are sold and kept by consumers and 
1 min{ , }G X Q  are sold but returned; min{ , }Q X Q− are unsold products quantity. Thereby, the revenue 
from the products that are sold and kept by consumers is 1 min{ , }pG X Q , the revenue from the products 
that are unsold but subsidized by the manufacture is ( )[ min{ , }]m s Q X Q+ − , and the revenue from the 
products that are bought but returned by consumers is ' 1( ) min{ , }Rp r m s l G X Q− + + − . The retailer’s 
procurement cost is wQ . Then his profit function can be expressed as 
( )1( ) min{ , } ( min{ , })R Q pG X Q m s Q X Qπ = + + −
'
1( ) min{ , }Rp r m s l G X Q wQ+ − + + − − .                          (1) 
Further, we can rewrite Eq. (1) as 
1( ) [ ( ) ]min{ , }R RQ p m s r l m s G X Qπ ′= − − − + − −
( )w m s Q− − − .                                                              (2) 
Note that min{ , } max{ ,0}X Q X X Q= − − , and insert it into Eq. (2) and after simply geometry 
operations ，then we can get the retailer’s  expected profit as follows 
( )1E[ ( )] [ ( ) ] E( ) E[max{ ,0}]R RQ p m s r l m s G X X Qπ ′= − − − + − − − −
( )w m s Q− − − .                                                            (3) 
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3.2 The manufacturer's profit model 
The manufacturer's profit depends on Q , the retailer ordered, and the markdown money m  he 
provides. Then the profit function for the manufacturer can be showed as 
1( ) ( ) 1 min{ , }M Q w c m Q m G X Qπ = − − + −（ ） .                               (4) 
Hence, the expected profit of the manufacture is as follows 
1E[ ( )] ( ) (1 )(E( ) E[max{ ,0}])M Q w c m Q m G X X Qπ = − − + − − − .  (5) 
3.3 The supply chain's profit model 
The profit of the supply chain is composed by the retailer's and the manufacturer's ones. Then we have 
the channel expected profit's expression as follows 
1E[ ( )] [ ( ) ](E( ) E[ max{ ,0}])C RQ p s r l s G X X Qπ ′= − − + − − −
( )c s Q− − .                                                             (6) 
4. Coordination Mechanism via Markdown Money Contract 
4.1 The centralized decision model 
In this subsection, the optimal order quantity will be considered in a centralized decision model as a 
benchmark.  
Rather than derive the optimality condition of the channel, we first digress by discussing the 
expected value of max{ ,0}X Q− . From the notion of X , we know that the mean and the standard 
deviation of X are ( ) μ+D r  and σ , respectively. So E( ) ( )X D r μ= + . However, since the distribution of 
X  is unknown, it is difficult for us to get the above expected profits directly. Taking the conservative 
approach proposed by Gallego and Moon (1993), we estimate E[max{ ,0}]X Q−  against the worst possible 
distribution as follows 
21E[max{ ,0}] D( ) ( E( )) ( E( ))
2
X Q X Q X Q X⎡ ⎤− ≤ + − − −⎣ ⎦
2 21 ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
2
Q D r Q D rσ μ μ⎡ ⎤= + − − − − −⎣ ⎦ .        (7) 
Now we recover to consider the optimality order quantity. Using first and second-order derivative in 
Eq. (6), it can be easily find E[ ( )]C Qπ  is a concave function in Q . By solving the first-order condition 
dE[ ( )] d 0C Q Qπ =  for Q , we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 The channel profit is a concave function in Q , and the equilibrium quantity is  
'
1*
'
1
( )
( )
2 ( )
R R R
C
R R R
p c l r s G c s
Q D r
c s p c l r s G
σμ
⎛ ⎞− − + − −⎜ ⎟= + + −⎜ ⎟− − − + −⎝ ⎠
.
4.2 The decentralized decision model 
The time sequence of this game is as follows: the manufacturer sets a pair of markdown money 
contract parameters ( ),w m ; and then the retailer reacts to determine order quantity according to the 
markdown money policy provided by the manufacturer; finally, the manufacturer decides the optimal 
contract parameters depending on the retailer's reaction. 
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For the given markdown money contract parameters ( ),w m , the retailer determines his optimal order 
quantity to get the maximum profit of his own, which means he faces the problem to solve
0
max E[ ( )]RQ Qπ≥ .
Similar to the method of deriving Proposition 1, we can get the optimal order quantity in the decentralized 
model, which is presented in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2 The retailer’s profit is a concave function in Q , and the optimal order quantity is 
'
1*
'
1
( )
( )
2 ( )
R R R
R
R R R
p w r l m s G w m s
Q D r
w m s p w r l m s G
σμ
⎛ ⎞− − + − − − −⎜ ⎟= + + −⎜ ⎟− − − − + − −⎝ ⎠
.
4.3 The decentralized decision model with coordination 
A coordination mechanism utilized by the manufacturer in a decentralized is to induce the retailer to 
order the quantity *1CQ , which means the retailer's order quantity in the decentralized model equals to that 
in the centralized one (i.e. * *R CQ Q= ) . Proposition 3 summarizes the coordination mechanism. 
Proposition 3 The supply chain can be coordinated by the markdown money contract ( ( ), )w m m  with 
ˆ0 Rm m< < , where 
'
1
1
( )ˆ
1
R R R
R
p s r l s Gm
G
− − + −= − , and 
' '
1 1
'
1
[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]( )
( )
R R R R R R
R R R
c p m s r l m s G m p l r s s Gw m
p s l r s G
− − − + − − + − + + −= − − + − .
Inserting the expression of ( )w m  into Eq. (6), we have the following Corollary 1. 
Corollary 1 When the supply chain is coordinated, we have 
'
* *1
2 2'
1
( )E[ ( )] E[ ( )]
( )
R R R
R C C C
R R R
p m s r l m s GQ Q
p s l r s G
π π− − − + − −= − − + − .
Corollary 1 explicitly means that the retailer's expected profit is a decreasing function of m . Note 
that * * *E[ ( )] E[ ( )] E[ ( )]C C R C M CQ Q Qπ π π= + and *E[ ( )]C CQπ is independent of m . Thus, *E[ ( )]M CQπ  is an 
increasing function of m . Since the manufacture's expected profit is an increasing function of the 
markdown money, he will set a unit markdown money as high as possible to maximize his own profit. 
But there is an upper bound for the markdown money as pointed in Proposition 3. The retailer will make a 
negative profit when the markdown money exceeds a certain one (i.e. ˆ Rm ), in that situation, the retailer 
will refuse the contract.  
Corollary 2 The ( )w m is an increasing function of m .
Proof ' 1
'
1
d ( ) d [ ( ) ]
d d ( )
R R R
R R R
w m c p m s r l m s G
m m p s l r s G
⎡ ⎤− − − + − −= ⎢ ⎥− − + −⎣ ⎦
'
1
'
1
d [ ( ) ]
d ( )
R R R
R R R
m p l r s s G
m p s l r s G
⎡ ⎤− + + −+ ⎢ ⎥− − + −⎣ ⎦
( )' 11
' '
1 1
( ) 0
( ) ( )
RR R
R R R R R R
c s Gp c l r s G
p s l r s G p s l r s G
−− − + −= + >− − + − − − + −
.
From corollary 2, we find that when the manufacturer offers the retailer a high unit markdown price, 
the manufacture will charge a high unit wholesale price at first.  
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5. Numerical Illustration 
In this section, we illustrate the effects of some factors on the equilibrium outcome and expected 
profits of the players. Relative parameters are given as follows: 
3.0m = , 2.0c = , 0 2.0c = , ( ) 5 0.5D r r= + , 0.2M Rl l= = , 6p = , 4r = , 1.2Ms = , ' 0.8Ms = , 1.0Rs = , ' 0.6Rs =
and ( )6,1v N∼ , 5μ = , 1σ = .
From table 1, given the markdown money, we derive following observations. When the unit returns 
cost ( 0c ) of consumer increases, the optimal quantity of the supply chain increases due to a lower 
returning probability, and the manufacturer will decrease the unit wholesale price. And both of the 
manufacturer and the retailer profit from the higher return cost. 
TABLE I. THE EFFECTS OF RETURN COST
0c *w *CQ
*
Mπ *Rπ *Cπ
0.10 4.4030 12.7399 27.0091 18.2353 45.2444
0.15 4.4027 12.7411 27.0781 18.2546 45.3327
0.20 4.4024 12.7421 27.1400 18.2719 45.4119
0.25 4.4021 12.7431 27.1955 18.2874 45.4829
0.30 4.4018 12.7439 27.2451 18.3013 45.5464
From table 2, with the increase of return price ( r ), the optimal order quantity goes up together with 
the wholesale price. An interesting thing is observed that the channel profit increases first but decreases 
when the return price exceeds a certain one.    
TABLE II. THE ECCECT OF THE RETURN PRICE 
r *w *CQ
*
Mπ *Rπ *Cπ
3.00 4.4002 12.2497 26.3792 17.6007 43.9799
3.50 4.4008 12.4983 26.8903 17.9861 44.8764
4.00 4.4024 12.7421 27.1400 18.2719 45.4119
4.50 4.4050 12.9710 26.6609 18.1470 44.8079
5.00 4.4062 13.1631 24.6558 16.8647 41.5205
As a detail discussion about the optimal return price under different return costs, we give table 3 to 
explicitly illustrate the effects of return cost. The optimal return price adds when the return cost becomes 
higher.  
TABLE III. THE EFFECT OF THE RETURN COST  ON THE OPTIAML RETURN PRICE   
0c *r *w *CQ
*
Mπ *Rπ *Cπ
0.10 3.9787 4.4029 12.7298 27.0149 18.2306 45.2454
0.15 4.0226 4.4028 12.7519 27.0738 18.2603 45.3340
0.20 4.0669 4.4027 12.7740 27.1326 18.2901 45.4227
0.25 4.1111 4.4025 12.7961 27.1914 18.3202 45.5116
0.30 4.1153 4.4024 12.8128 27.2501 18.3504 45.6005
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6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we study coordination of a supply chain integrating consumer return under a decision 
environment with little information of demand distribution. Differing from Xiao's model, we limit the 
demand distribution to the mean and the variance. By the means of distribution free approach, we 
establish a centralized model and a decentralized one, respectively. We design a mechanism to make the 
decentralized model perfectly coordinated.  At the end of this paper, we provide several numerical 
illustrations to examine the effects of the consumer return behavior on the supply chain's performance.   
Future research can be done in following directions. First, return time can be considered in the 
supply chain. Second, consumer's valuation can be described as a fuzzy function, which may be more 
proper.   
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